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Abstract
When it comes to economic reforms in developing countries, many economists agree on
broad objectives (such as fostering outward orientation). Broad objectives, however, can
be pursued in many different ways, and policy experimentation is often indispensable for
learning which alternative works locally. We propose a simple model to study this societal
learning process. The model explores the role of disagreeing beliefs about “what works”.
It suggests that this type of disagreement can stall the societal learning process and cause
economic stagnation. Interestingly, this can happen even if everybody knows that Pareto-
improving reforms do exist. Our analysis is motivated by the empirical observation of a
negative relationship between disagreement and economic growth among poorer countries.
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1 Introduction
There is little disagreement when it comes to the broad objectives of important economic re-
forms in developing countries. Many economists think that growth rates in poor places can
be improved by strengthening the security of property rights, market-oriented incentives, and
outward orientation. However, as ever, the devil lies in the detail. A particular objective can
be approached in many different ways. For instance, as highlighted by Rodrik (2008), out-
ward orientation can be promoted through import liberalization, by paying export subsidies,
or by establishing export-processing zones. What is more, the nature of the “most appropri-
ate” reform policy is often highly context-specific, i.e., depends on the existing institutional
framework (e.g., Commission on Growth and Development, 2008; Rodrik, 2010). For instance,
export subsidies might be the appropriate choice if the financial system fails to funnel credit
to the most competitive firms (while, under these circumstances, a policy of rapid import lib-
eralization might be ineffective or even harmful for total factor productivity). On the other
hand, import liberalization might be the successful approach if credit markets manage to allo-
cate capital quite effi ciently (while, in such a situation, the introduction of an export-subsidy
scheme might have little or even a negative overall impact on productivity).
The contextual nature of the policy-reform process entails that there is often substantial
ambiguity as to which reform measures work and which ones are more likely to be ineffective
or even harmful.1 Clearly, this ambiguity also fosters disagreement about appropriate reform
plans (Rodrik, 2010). From the point of view of an impartial “planner”, policy experimenta-
tion is often instrumental for learning about what works and what does not.2 However, as a
matter of fact, people, policy makers, and experts alike often hold strong and opposing opin-
ions about appropriate reforms (Rodrik, 2010). This can interfere with a society’s propensity
to experiment. The more some segments of society are convinced that a particular reform
proposal is misguided anyway, the more inclined they will be to spend resources to block the
approval or implementation of that reform. As a result, there may be little experimentation
and little learning about which specific reform measures work. In this paper, we develop a
simple theoretical model to systematically explore the consequences of disagreeing beliefs for
policy experimentation, societal learning, and economic development.
1This ambiguity is reflected in a statement by Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore who
initiated sweeping economic reforms. He writes: “I started out with great trepidation on a journey along an
unmarked road to an unknown destination.” (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008, p. 29.)
2Some scholars (e.g., Heilmann, 2008; Rodrik, 2010; Xu, 2011) argue that policy experimentation played
a crucial role in China’s economic rise. Similarly, many successful East Asian countries (e.g., South Korea,
Taiwan) tried out unconventional and tailor-made trade policies to integrate with the world economy.
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It has been common among economists to relate disagreement about alternative reform
policies to conflicts of interest. However, Saint-Paul (2010) forcefully argues that this provides
an incomplete account of reality:
In most situations the reform process is associated with a debate and the debate
is about what the economic effects of the reform are and how the mechanisms
underlying those effects work. People disagree not only because their net gains
differ but also because they have a different understanding of how the reform works.
This aspect is typically neglected in our analysis which assumes that all agents use
a single, objective model —the correct model of the economy —to compute their
gains and losses. If this were true, there would not need to be a debate. But in
real-world situations the reform is heavily discussed because there is disagreement
on how it will work. (p. 325)
The literature has established several sources of such genuine disagreement. Sethi and
Yildiz (2012), for instance, show that persistent disagreement arises in fragmented or segregated
societies where individuals do not observe other individuals’priors or where they only observe
the priors of individuals within their own social group. Suen (2004) shows that there can
even be a rationally induced demand for information from like-minded sources. Psychological
explanations of disagreement highlight the role of overconfidence and that people tend to
estimate the precision of their own beliefs higher than of others’ beliefs (e.g., Alpert and
Raiffa, 1982; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Andreoni and Mylovanov, 2012).3 In this paper, we
take the existence of initial disagreement as given. We do assume, however, that people learn
accurately from reform experiences so that disagreement may weaken over time.
In our model, there are two political actors, an incumbent and an opposition. The incum-
bent is in control of the executive and may propose a specific reform policy. This reform policy
is implemented unless the opposition puts in its veto, in which case the inherited default policy
remains in force. Vetoing a proposed policy is costly, and we take the magnitude of this cost
as a measure of the executive’s strength. The incumbent can choose among two alternative
reforms. One alternative is successful, whereas the other one is harmful. From the perspective
3 Interestingly, Rodrik (2010) himself alludes to psychological factors behind disagreeing beliefs: “Researchers
and academics ... have to resist the temptation to substitute prepackaged solutions for nuance and skepticism.
The record suggests they have not always been very good at this. Despite their scientific demeanor, economists
are subject to the same cognitive biases as others: overconfidence, tendency to join the herd, and proclivity to
overlook contradictory evidence. As a consequence, too often they become associated with (and promoters of)
universal blueprints only loosely grounded in theory and evidence.” (p. 40)
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of an impartial observer, there is a high degree of uncertainty about which is the successful
one. However, the political actors hold non-neutral and disagreeing prior beliefs in this re-
gard, implying that each group perceives the other group’s favorite reform as harmful. The
implementation of any of these two reforms, and the subsequent observation of the aggregate
output, allows the two actors to update their beliefs. However, uncertainty is not completely
eliminated because the economy is subject to confounding exogenous shocks.
We show that in such an environment the reform process may come to a complete standstill.
This can happen even though everybody knows that a Pareto-improving reform does exist. To
see why, consider the situation of the opposition. The opposition believes that the reform
favored by the incumbent is harmful and hence certainly costly in the short term. Moroever,
from the opposition’s perspective, the incumbent will update its belief about what works only
insuffi ciently after the implementation of its proposal. Specifically, after observing the output,
the incumbent may stick to the initial policy even if — in the opposition’s view — the news
is not good and would mandate a reversal of the reform. This low propensity to revisit past
reforms is anticipated by the opposition. It may therefore expect a negative overall payoff from
experimentation and hence incur the cost of a veto to save the status quo.
Such a “gridlock equilibrium”leads to economic stagnation and emerges whenever exoge-
nous shocks are suffi ciently big and the executive is suffi ciently weak. The model therefore
offers a new perspective on the lack of sustained growth in parts of the developing world,
where it is common that economies are exposed to big exogenous shocks (because they spe-
cialize in volatile sectors —see, e.g., Koren and Tenreyro, 2007) and where executives tend to
be weak (because of low bureaucratic capacity —see, e.g., Rauch and Evans, 2000). Our model
further predicts that a higher degree of disagreement reduces economic growth. Using data on
political attitudes from the World Value Survey, we document the existence of such a negative
correlation in a cross-section of 58 developing and emerging economies.
Although the importance of the experimental approach to development policy has been
advocated for a while (e.g., North, 1990; Roland, 2000; Mukand and Rodrik, 2005), there is
relatively little theoretical work on societal learning through experimentation. Majumdar and
Mukand (2004) show that, because of reputation concerns, politicians may have incentives
to go along with reforms even if the latter have turned out to be inappropriate. In other
cases, politicians may be excessively conservative about experimenting. Mukand and Rodrik
(2005) consider a setup in which successful reform policies are specific to local conditions.
Politicians can either copy reforms that were successful elsewhere, or they can engage in a
discovery process about what works locally. The basic trade-off between these choices is that
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policies copied from other countries may not be adapted to local circumstances, while local
experimentation provides scope for corrupt behavior. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) consider
the case of a country that needs to learn what it is good at producing. None of these papers,
however, considers the effects of disagreement about the prospects of a reform.4
On a broader level, this paper is related to different strands of literature on societal or social
learning. In macroeconomics and finance, contributions to the learning literature typically
assume that individuals do not perfectly know the structure of the economy and/or do not form
rational expectations (see, e.g., Evans and Honkapohja, 2011, for a recent survey). However,
this literature is mainly focused on monetary policy or phenomena like asset bubbles. Another
strand of the learning literature takes a more microeconomic perspective and explores social
learning from, e.g., neighbors about new agricultural technologies (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig,
1995; Munshi, 2004; Conley and Udry, 2010). With this literature, we share the focus on
developing countries; however, our analysis is at a more aggregate level, focusing on economic
policy and the role of disagreeing beliefs about what policies work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some evidence
on disagreement and economic growth. Section 3 introduces the basic model. In Section 4,
we solve the model and discuss the factors determining whether an “experimentation” or a
“gridlock”equilibrium emerges. Section 5 focuses on growth and Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivating Evidence
How does disagreement about key economic reforms relate to long-run economic performance?
This section presents some motivating evidence in this regard. Relying on a cross section of
58 developing and emerging economies, we document a remarkably strong negative correlation
between disagreement and economic growth in the 1980-2009 period.
Following Lindqvist and Östling (2010), our measure of disagreeing beliefs is based on four
attitude questions from the World Value Survey. The four questions investigate people’s broad
attitudes towards income inequality, the role of the government, and economic competition.
More specifically, people are confronted with four polar statements (which are listed in Table
1, Panel A) and then asked how much they agree or disagree with each of these statements
(on a 1-10 scale). To obtain a proxy for disagreeing beliefs at the country level, we calculate
the standard deviations of the answers separately for each of the four questions, using as many
4Somewhat relatedly, the literature on institutional design (e.g., Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi, 2004) investi-
gates the optimal degree of insulation of a leader, i.e., the share of votes that can block a leader when he tries
to implement legislation. This literature, however, is not concerned with societal learning.
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years as are available from the 1980-2009 period. These standard deviations are then averaged
(by country) across the four questions. A high average is taken as a (crude) proxy for strongly
disagreeing beliefs about the nature of appropriate economic reforms.
Economic performance is measured by the average annual growth rate of GDP p.c. (PPP,
in constant 2005 I$) over the 1980-2009 period. To account for the possibility that our dis-
agreement measure may partly reflect heterogeneity in terms of income or culture, we control
for two additional variables that are known to correlate with growth. These are the Gini index
of the income distribution (averaged over the 1980-2009 period), and a standard index of eth-
nolinguistic fractionalization.5 We focus on countries that are not among founding members of
the OECD. For 58 of these countries (listed in Table 1, Panel B), the required data is available.
Table 1 here
The main empirical pattern is presented in Figure 1. The figure shows a partial regression
plot, illustrating a negative correlation between average annual GDP p.c. growth (residuals)
and disagreement about economic policies.6 The estimated coeffi cient on disagreement (which
is the slope of the fitted line in the figure) is −0.016 (p-value: 0.053), implying that an increase
in disagreement from the 10th to the 90th percentile is associated with a fall in annual GDP
p.c. growth of 1.29 percentage points. This is a sizable correlation, considering the fact that
the 90th-to-10th-percentile difference in the annual growth rate is just 3.96 percentage points.
The correlation between the two variables is also quite robust: Its magnitude is unchanged
when we leave out the Gini index, or the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, or both; at
the same time, the estimate turns significant at the 1%-level in all these cases.
Figure 1 here
Obviously, we cannot draw strong conclusions from Figure 1. Our data is purely cross-
sectional and the proxy for disagreeing beliefs is relatively indirect. However, the figure does
call attention to the fact that there is a robust negative relationship between economic growth
and disagreement about key economic policies in a cross-section of poorer economies. We
find this negative relationship although we control for income inequality and ethnolinguistic
fractionalization. The theory we develop below offers an explanation for this correlation.
5The data on GDP p.c. and income inequality comes from the World Development Indicators. Our measure
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is the ELF(15) index provided by Desmet et al. (2012).
6The underlying OLS regression relates average annual GDP p.c. growth to: a constant (0.1364∗∗∗); our
measure of disagreement (−0.01578∗); the Gini index of the income distribution (−0.0001); the index of eth-
nolinguistic fractionalization (−0.0168∗∗∗); and the log GDP p.c. in 1980 (−0.0075∗∗∗). Point estimates are
given in parenthesis. Significance at the 1%- and 10%-level is indicated by ∗∗∗ and ∗, respectively.
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3 The Model
3.1 Agents, Preferences, and Technologies
We consider a two-period economy that is populated by a continuum of individuals of mass
one. There are two groups of individuals that differ in their beliefs regarding the impact of
alternative economic policies (as is discussed below), but are identical in all other dimensions.
The groups are dubbed left and right, and are indexed by L and R.
Each individual derives utility from consumption of the single (non-storable) output good
that is produced in the economy. Overall utility is given by
Ui = xi,0 + βxi,1, (1)
where xi,t refers to consumption of a representative member of group i ∈ {L,R} in period
t ∈ {0, 1} and β > 0 reflects the importance of second-period consumption.
All individuals have access to a uniform technology which generates a period income of
Yt = A+ Πta+ σεt
units of the output good. In the above equation, A is the non-random part of the period income;
a ∈ {−θ, θ} stands for an unobserved binary random variable that materializes before the
economy starts and remains constant over time; Πt refers to the economic policy implemented in
period t; εt represents an exogenous shock which is independent of a and distributed according
to a standard normal distribution; σ ≥ 0 is a constant that scales the variance of the disturbance
term.7 Since none of our results depends on A, we normalize it to zero, such that
Yt = Πta+ σεt. (2)
At the end of each period, all individuals observe Yt but neither a nor εt. The ex ante
probability of a = −θ is denoted by p. As we will discuss below, the two groups, L and R,
hold disagreeing beliefs about the value of p.
3.2 Policies and the Political Process
Policies. There are three different policy options, Πt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. The middle option, 0,
represents the inherited “default policy” in period 0, whereas both −1 and 1 are “reform
7For analytical convenience, we allow ε and hence Y to take on values on the entire real line. Alternatively,
we could define output as eY . This approach would guarantee strictly positive output levels, but would also
complicate the analysis without leading to any additional insights.
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policies”. We refer to policy −1 as the left reform policy, and to policy 1 as the right reform
policy (without any political connotation). Clearly, whether or not a given reform (i.e., a
deviation from the default policy) improves or impairs economic performance depends on the
unobserved realization of a ∈ {−θ, θ}. For instance, if a were equal to −θ, option −1 would
represent a successful reform while the alternative would be a failure.
In practice, governments concerned with reforms are often confronted with such situations.
For instance, as discussed in the introduction, a government concerned with outward orienta-
tion might have to choose between import liberalization and export subsidies without exactly
knowing which of the two measures is the appropriate one under local circumstances. Another
example would be the reform of credit-market institutions. Suppose that a developing-country
government has to choose between investing in contract-enforcement institutions (i.e., the court
system) or in information institutions (i.e., credit registries). This is not an obvious choice be-
cause, according to the huge literature on financial imperfections (see, e.g., Banerjee and Duflo,
2010, for an overview), the nature of the successful reform is likely to depend on the impor-
tance of relationship lending, a variable that is hard to observe. If relationship lending were
rather unimportant, the first option would be likely to improve matters a lot (while the benefits
from investing in credit registries might not cover the costs). However, if relationship lending
were important, investing in credit registries would be the optimal choice (while investing in
law-enforcement institutions might even be harmful).
Political process. In the beginning, “nature” determines which of the two groups is in
control of the executive over the entire two periods.8 We refer to this group as the incumbent,
while the other group is called the opposition. The incumbent proposes a specific policy
πt ∈ {−1, 0, 1} in each of the two periods, t ∈ {0, 1}. The proposed policy is adopted and
implemented unless the opposition puts in its “veto”. More specifically, we assume that the
implemented policy is determined according to
Πt = πt(1− vt) + vtDt, (3)
where Dt ∈ {−1, 0, 1} stands for the “default policy”and vt ∈ {0, 1} refers to the decision on
the “veto”, with 1 indicating that the proposed policy is blocked. Regarding the default policy,
we have D0 = 0. Furthermore, today’s policy choice is tomorrow’s default policy:
Dt+1 = Πt. (4)
8Note that we do not consider a change in the control of the executive between the two periods. Rather,
the two periods 0 and 1 should be interpreted as two sub-periods constituting a full legislative term.
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Blocking a reform is costly. For the opposition, a veto is associated with expenses of ct ≥ 0 units
of output. In what follows, we take this cost to reflect the incumbent’s executive strength: If a
veto is expensive, the incumbent is strong because it takes much effort to prevent a proposed
policy from taking effect, and vice versa.
In practice, the strength of the executive depends on many factors, both fundamental and
time-varying. Executive strength is surely affected by a country’s political institutions. The
executive is relatively weak if it is constrained by a powerful system of checks and balances that
allows the opposition to delay, dilute, or veto a proposed policy at little effort.9 In contrast, if
formal checks and balances are weak, the executive is strong since blocking a proposed policy
tends to involve coslty measures such as organizing strikes or stirring up demonstrations. A
further important determinant of executive strength is the capacity of the bureaucracy to
implement formally adopted policies. If this capacity is low (e.g., because of ineffective oversight
of bureaucrats or lacking human resources), the executive is weak as opposition groups might
be able to “throw off course” the implementation of policies at little effort (e.g., by paying
modest bribes to key offi cials).10 In contrast, if bureaucratic capacity is high, inducing key
offi cials not to comply with reform directives tends to be costly.
Finally, next to these fundamental factors, executive strength may be affected by the his-
tory of economic reforms. In practice, reversing a recently implemented reform is a complex
endeavor that, among other things, requires a disproportionate effort from the part of the
bureaucracy. It is therefore natural to assume that it is comparatively easy to make the bu-
reaucracy undermine a reversal of a previous reform. In our model, this means c1 < c0 if Π0 6= 0
(and c1 = c0 otherwise). More specifically, throughout the paper, we assume c0 = c ≥ 0 and
c1 =
 c if Π0 = 00 if Π0 6= 0 . (5)
This assumption captures in a simple way the notion that executive strength is reduced if a
reversal is attempted. At the same time, focusing on this limiting case simplifies the deriva-
tion of the equilibrium. However, as discussed in Appendix B, the model generates similar
implications if past reforms do not weaken the executive (and hence c1 = c0 in all cases).
9 In the related literature, capturing checks and balances through the presence of veto powers is a usual
approach (see, e.g., Diermeier and Myerson, 1999). In practice, systems of checks and balances often involve
judicial review of executive/legislative acts or a legislature that consists of two chambers; or that needs to pass
important laws with a supermajority; or that may amend policy proposals by the executive.
10Political scientists (e.g., Huber and McCarty, 2004) have identified low bureaucratic capacity, and the
associated susceptibility for corruption, as a major obstacle to the implementation of reforms.
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3.3 Beliefs about Reforms
A key assumption in our model is that there is disagreement between groups L and R about
the appropriate reform policy. In formal terms, we assume that the groups have heterogeneous
priors about p. Members of group L believe that p is equal to pL > 1/2, while members of
group R think that p = pR < 1/2. As a result, group L believes that reform policy left is more
promising than policy right (whereas the opposite holds for group R). Note further that our
assumptions imply that a priori each group perceives the other group’s favorite reform proposal
as harmful. While we take the existence of disagreeing prior beliefs as given, we assume that
people learn from public information according to Bayes’rule.
Although we do not model the emergence of disagreeing beliefs, it is natural to think that
they stem from different exposures to schools of thought or foreign reform experiences. For
instance, returning to the example of credit-market reform discussed above, people who were
trained that information matters for lending might selectively look at examples of successful
introductions of credit registries abroad —and hence may develop a strong belief that these
institutions are also key to success at home. On the other hand, people concerned with contract
enforcement might focus their attention on successful examples of judicial reforms —and hence
get convinced that such reforms are also instrumental to success at home.
3.4 Timing of the Political Game
The timing of the political game is as follows.
• Period 0:
—Nature determines a (unobserved) and the identity of the incumbent (L or R).
—The incumbent proposes a policy π0.
—The opposition decides whether or not to veto the proposal, i.e., chooses v0.
—Nature determines Y0, and all agents update their beliefs.
• Period 1:
—The incumbent proposes a policy π1.
—The opposition decides whether or not to veto the proposal, i.e., chooses v1.
—Nature determines Y1.
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The information structure in this game is such that both groups perfectly know each others’
preferences and beliefs, and also observe each others’actions. The only uncertainty concerns
nature which determines the underlying state of the world a ∈ {−θ, θ} and the disturbance
terms ε0, ε1. However, since nature is not a strategic player, the above game is de facto a
dynamic game with complete information. Therefore, it can simply be solved by backward
induction. We require players to have beliefs that are consistent with Bayes’ law and to
correctly anticipate each others’posterior beliefs.
4 Solving the Political Game
In this section, we solve the political game by means of backward induction. Without loss of
generality, we henceforth assume that group L is chosen to be the incumbent.
4.1 Second Period
4.1.1 No Policy Reform in t = 0 (Π0 = 0)
Suppose first that Π0 = D1 = 0. According to equation (3), and because D0 = 0, this situation
arises if in t = 0 group L has proposed the middle policy option (i.e., π0 = 0) or if opposition
group R has used its veto (i.e., v0 = 1). Under these circumstances, individuals are not able
to update their beliefs with respect to a and hence stick to their priors: Group L continues to
think that reform policy left is the appropriate one; group R still favors right.
Consider now group R’s decision problem. Following group L’s choice of π1, group R
refrains from using its veto if policies are not proposed to change (i.e., if π1 = D1 = 0) since a
veto would be without any effect in this case. Otherwise, if either π1 = −1 or π1 = 1, group
R’s expected consumption in t = 1 is given by pRπ1(−θ) + (1− pR)π1θ if the group does not
use its veto; and by −c if it does use the veto. Comparing these two expressions shows that
group R vetoes π1 6= 0 if and only if
π1 (2pR − 1) θ > c.
Note that —since pR < 1/2 —the above condition requires both π1 = −1 and (1− 2pR) θ > c.
Group L’s policy proposal π1 is determined as follows. Since the group still prefers reform
policy left, it opts for π1 = −1 (although this option is only weakly preferred if a veto is
anticipated). Thus, to summarize, if Π0 = D1 = 0, we have
(π1, v1)|D1=0 =
 (−1, 1) if (1− 2pR) θ > c(−1, 0) if (1− 2pR) θ ≤ c . (6)
11
4.1.2 Policy Reform in t = 0 (Π0 6= 0)
Updating beliefs. Suppose now that in t = 0 group L was able to implement one of the
two reform policies (i.e, Π0 = D1 6= 0). Then, after observing Y0, all individuals update their
prior beliefs by using Bayes’rule. In what follows, we denote group i’s posterior belief about
a, given Y0 and Π0, by µi(a = −θ|Y0,Π0). Bayes’rule implies
µi(a = −θ|Y0,Π0) =
f (Y0| a = −θ,Π0) · pi
f (Y0| a = −θ,Π0) · pi + f (Y0| a = θ,Π0) · (1− pi)
, (7)
where f ( ·| a = −θ,Π0) denotes the density function of the normally distributed random vari-
able Y0|a=−θ,Π0 and f ( ·| a = θ,Π0) refers to the density function of Y0|a=θ,Π0 . To save on
notation, we henceforth stick to the following notation:
µi,−1 ≡ µi(a = −θ|Y0,Π0 = −1) and µi,+1 ≡ µi(a = −θ|Y0,Π0 = 1).
Policy left implemented in t = 0. If group L was able to implement its preferred policy









. Given this, and taking into account the functional form of the standard normal







exp (−(Y0 − θ)2/(2σ2)) · pi + exp (−(Y0 + θ)2/(2σ2)) · (1− pi)
.
Assuming that agents maximize expected utility, it follows from (1) that it is crucial for group
i’s attitude towards Π1 whether or not µi,−1 is greater than 1/2. If this is the case, the group
would like to stick to the implemented reform policy left ; otherwise, it would prefer policy







exp (−(Y0 + θ)2/(2σ2))
≥ 1,
which, in turn, can be rearranged to obtain







≡ Y i,−1. (8)
Note that Y i,−1 is decreasing in pi so that Y L,−1 < Y R,−1. Hence, the more optimistic a
group’s initial view on reform policy left is, the lower the realized level of output must be in
order to make the group prefer the alternative reform policy in t = 1. Moreover, a higher
degree of exogenous variation in the output variable (relative to the impact of a policy change,
θ) amplifies the absolute difference between the two thresholds.
Consider now group R’s decision problem. It follows from (2) that the group’s expected
second-period consumption is given by [µR(−θ) + (1− µR)θ]π1 if it does not use its veto; and
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by [µR,−1(−θ) + (1 − µR,−1)θ](−1) if does use its veto (according to equation 5, vetoing a






A necessary condition for a veto is thus that a policy change is proposed (i.e., π1 6= −1).
Obviously, if there is no attempt to change policy, a veto does not have any effect and hence
is not used. Moreover, there can only be a veto if µR,−1 > 1/2, i.e., if group R’s belief of the
probability of a = −θ is greater than 1/2 (instead of lower, according to the initial belief).
This, in turn, requires Y0 ≥ Y R,−1.
We now turn to group L’s choice of π1. As discussed above, the group wants to revise its
initial choice if Y0 < Y L,−1. In this case, we have π1 = 1, a decision that would not be vetoed
later on by group R because Y L,−1 < Y R,−1. In other words, if Y0 < Y L,−1, both groups
agree that reform policy right is appropriate (and left is a failure). Otherwise, if Y0 exceeds
the threshold Y L,−1, group L sticks to its initial policy choice (i.e., π1 = −1) and, again, there
will not be a veto since it would be without any effect. To summarize, we have
(π1, v1)|D1=−1 =
 (−1, 0) if Y0 ≥ Y L,−1(+1, 0) if Y0 < Y L,−1 . (9)
Policy right implemented in t = 0. Assume now that the policy implemented in t = 0 was





Using the functional form of the standard normal density in equation (7), and following an








≡ Y i,+1. (10)
A posterior belief µi,+1 greater than 1/2 implies again that group i prefers policy left over
policy right. However, since policy right was implemented in t = 0, µi,+1 ≥ 1/2 means this
time that group i prefers to change policy (from right to left) rather than to stick to it. Note
that Y i,+1 is increasing in pi so that Y L,+1 > Y R,+1. Hence, the more optimistic a group’s
initial view on reform option left is, the higher the realized level of output must be in order to
convince the group that option right has been the appropriate choice.
Group R’s expected second-period consumption is given by [µR,+1(−θ) + (1−µR,+1)θ]π1 if
it does not use its veto; otherwise, in the case of a veto, expected second-period consumption







As above, it is immediately clear that a veto will only be used if policies are proposed to change
(i.e., π1 6= 1). Moreover, consistent with group R’s initial belief, µR,+1 must be less than 1/2
—which, in turn, requires Y0 > Y R,−1.
Group L’s decision on π1 depends on whether or not Y0 is less than Y L,+1. If Y0 ≤ Y L,+1,
the group proposes to change policy from right to left (i.e., π1 = −1), a decision that will be
vetoed later on by group R if Y0 > Y R,−1. Otherwise, if Y0 > Y L,+1, the incumbent sticks to
policy right (i.e., π1 = 1), a decision that does not trigger a veto because group R agrees (and,
in any case, a veto would be ineffective). To summarize, we have
(π1, v1)|D1=1 =

(−1, 0) if Y0 ≤ Y R,+1 < Y L,+1
(−1, 1) if Y R,+1 < Y0 ≤ Y L,+1
(+1, 0) if Y R,+1 < Y L,+1 < Y0
. (11)
4.2 First Period
4.2.1 Decision on the Veto
Regarding group R’s decision on v0, it is immediately clear that neither π0 = 0 nor π0 = 1
would trigger a veto. Vetoing these proposals would either be useless or against the group’s
own interest. However, if π0 = −1, group R may want to block the proposed policy.
Opposition’s payoff from policy left. The decisive factor for group R’s decision on
whether or not to veto policy left is the expected payoff under its belief p = pR. Suppose
that group R does not use its veto. Then, taking into account the impact of today’s decision
on choices tomorrow (equation 9), group R’s expected overall utility is
ER {UR|π0 = −1, v0 = 0} = pRθ − (1− pR)θ + βθ∆R,−1, (12)
where the last term in (12) reflects group R’s valuation of policy experimentation and
∆R,−1 = (2pR − 1) + 2(1− pR) Pr
[
Y0 < Y L,−1
∣∣ a = θ, Π0 = −1] (13)
−2pR Pr
[
Y0 < Y L,−1
∣∣ a = −θ, Π0 = −1] .
Note that ∆R,−1 would take the simple form Φ (θ/σ)− Φ (−θ/σ) if we had neutral and hence
agreeing beliefs (i.e., pL = pR = 1/2), where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function
of the standard normal distribution. Clearly, in that case, ∆R,−1 would be strictly positive,
reflecting the value of experimentation in a world with neutral priors. However, even then,
∆R,−1 would converge to zero as the variance of the exogenous shock goes to infinity: If σ is
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large, Y0 is a very noisy signal about a so that the expected payoff from experimentation is
small. For the case of non-neutral and disagreeing beliefs, we have the following results:
Proposition 1 Group R’s valuation of experimentation with reform policy left is given by
βθ∆R,−1, where ∆R,−1 is (i) striclty decreasing in the variance of the exogenous shock, falling
from 1 to 2pR − 1 < 0 as σ rises from 0 to infinity; (ii) and striclty decreasing in the degree of
disagreement (i.e., it decreases as pL rises or pR falls).
Proof. See Appendix A.
As in the case of neutral beliefs, a higher variance of the exogenous shock lowers the value of
experimentation because Y0 becomes a less informative signal. However, with non-neutral and
disagreeing priors, group R’s valuation of policy experimentation decreases even more strongly.
Group R anticipates that, the higher the variance of the shock, the less likely it will be that
group L would ever revise its view about the appropriate reform (see equation 8).
A similar intuition explains the impact of stronger disagreement. The higher pL, the less
likely it becomes that group L will revise its view (see equation 8, again) and switch to policy
right, i.e., to the policy group R thinks is appropriate ex ante. In addition, group R’s perceived
value of experimentation decreases as pR falls. The lower pR, the higher the expected damage
associated with sticking to the —from group R ’s perspective —inappropriate policy left.
Decision on vetoing policy left. Having established group R’s payoff from policy ex-
perimentation, we can now determine under which circumstances policy left will be vetoed.
Expected utility associated with v0 = 0 is given by equation (12). On the other hand, if v0 = 1,
tomorrow’s equilibrium decisions are characterized by equation (6) because there is no change
to the default policy (i.e., D1 = 0). In this case, expected utility can be expressed as
ER {UR|π0 = −1, v0 = 1} =
 −(1 + β)c if (1− 2pR) θ > c−c+ β(2pR − 1)θ if (1− 2pR) θ ≤ c . (14)
For further use below, we establish the following result:
Lemma 1 If opposition group R (weakly) prefers to veto reform policy left in t = 0, the group
will strictly prefer to use its veto against left in t = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Obviously, if policy left is vetoed in t = 0, when there is still a possible future payoff from
experimentation, the adoption of left must be prevented in the final period as well.
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To describe the parameter constellation under which a veto against left arises, we define a
function σ̃R(c), which, for given beliefs pL and pR, assigns to each c a value of σ such that
ER {UR|π0 = −1, v0 = 0} = ER {UR|π0 = −1, v0 = 1} . (15)
In other words, if σ = σ̃R(c), group R is indifferent regarding the use of its veto in t = 0.
Lemma 2 below characterizes the shape of the σ̃(c)-function.
Lemma 2 The function σ̃R(c) has the shape as shown in Figure 2a., i.e., it is strictly increas-
ing from zero to infinity on the interval [(1− 2pR − β)/(1 + β)θ, (1− 2pR)θ].
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 2a. shows for which (c, σ)−combinations group R does (above the σ̃R−line) or does
not (below the σ̃R−line) veto reform policy left, given pL and pR. Policy left passes if the
executive is suffi ciently strong (i.e., if the cost of a veto is suffi ciently high) or if the variance
of the exogenous shock is suffi ciently low (i.e., if observing Y0 is suffi ciently informative).
Figure 2 here
4.2.2 Decision on Policy
We now move on to the last step, the determination of the policy proposal by group L. Since
pL > 1/2, the group prefers reform policy left. It is thus immediately clear that π0 = −1 if this
proposal will not be vetoed by group R. The situation is more involved, however, if group R is
set to veto policy left. In this case, group L considers its expected utility under the alternative
reform option: Because policy right would not be blocked, opting for π0 = 1 would permit
experimentation and learning. Therefore, and in particular if pL is close to 1/2 (i.e., if group
L is “centrist”), group L may prefer policy right over political gridlock.
To find out, we have to derive EL {UL|Π0 = 1} . Taking into account the impact of today’s
decision on equilibrium choices tomorrow (equation 11), we obtain
EL {UL|Π0 = 1} = −pLθ + (1− pL)θ + βθ∆L,+1, (16)
where ∆L,+1 is defined by equation (20) in Appendix A. The last term in (16) reflects group
L’s valuation of policy experimentation. The properties of ∆L,+1, which are stated in the
following proposition, are similar to those of ∆R,−1:
Proposition 2 Group L’s valuation of experimentation with reform policy right is given by
βθ∆L,+1, where ∆L,+1 is (i) striclty decreasing in the variance of the exogenous shock, falling
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from 1 to 1− 2pL < 0 as σ rises from 0 to infinity; (ii) and striclty decreasing in the degree of
disagreement (i.e., it decreases as pL rises or pR falls).
Proof. See Appendix A.
In anticipation of a veto against policy left, group L proposes right if EL {UL|Π0 = 1} is
greater than zero, the overall utility associated with π0 ∈ {−1, 0}, which follows from Lemma 1
and equation (6). Otherwise, the group opts for policy left (although this policy choice is only
weakly preferred if a veto is anticipated). From Proposition 2, it follows that EL {UL|Π0 = 1}
is decreasing in σ, with EL {UL|Π0 = 1} = θ(1 − 2pL + β) if σ = 0. As a result, there exists
a strictly positive σ̃L such that EL {UL|Π0 = 1} = 0 if and only if 1 − 2pL + β > 0, which is
the case if pL is suffi ciently close to neutral and the future carries a suffi ciently high weight.
Assuming that 1 − 2pL + β > 0 holds, Figure 2b. illustrates for which (c, σ)−combinations
group L prefers to propose policy right (below the σ̃L−line) rather than to opt for policy left.
4.2.3 Equilibrium and Discussion
Figure 3 combines the information provided in Figures 2a. and 2b. A solid line separates
(c, σ)−combinations giving rise to a “gridlock equilibrium” from combinations leading to an
“experimentation equilibrium”.11 In the gridlock equilibrium (area above the solid line), group
L proposes policy left in t = 0, a choice that is vetoed by group R. In formal terms, we have
π0 = −1 and v0 = 1. Moreover, it follows from Lemma 1 and equation (6) that these choices
are repeated in t = 1. Hence, in the gridlock equilibrium, reform attempts are repeatedly
blocked, the default policy is in force in both periods, and learning is absent.
Figure 3 here
The situation is different in the experimentation equilibrium (area below the solid line). In
t = 0, group L proposes either policy left (below the solid and the dashed lines) or policy right
(between the solid and the dashed lines). In both cases, the group’s decision is not vetoed
later on (i.e., we have either (π0, v0) = (−1, 0) or (π0, v0) = (1, 0)). Because a reform policy
is in fact implemented, agents are able to update their beliefs after observing Y0. As a result,
the initial policy decision may be revised in t = 1. Decisions in this latter period are given by
equation (9) if π0 = −1 and by equation (11) if π0 = 1.
11The term “experimentation”is to be understood somewhat differently to, e.g., the context of microeconomic
field experiments. In our case of a macroeconomic policy reform, there is no control treatment, and often cannot
be (see, however, Xu, 2011, for a discussion of macroeconomic experiments in China, were some provinces are
chosen as “treatment”group and non-treated provinces form the control group).
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Figure 3 can also be used to characterize the circumstances under which the gridlock equi-
librium may arise. Note first that the asymptote of the σ̃R-curve coincides with the y-axis if pR
is equal to 1/2 (while the asymptote lies strictly to the right of the y-axis if pR < 1/2). Hence,
the gridlock equilibrium cannot exist in the limiting case pR = 1/2. Regarding σ̃L, observe
that equation (16) and Proposition 2 imply limσ→∞EL {UL|Π0 = 1} = 0 if pL is equal to 1/2
(while this limit is strictly less than 0 if pL > 1/2). Hence, in the limiting case pL = 1/2, we
have σ̃L →∞ so that, once again, the gridlock equilibrium cannot exist. However, except for
the cases in which (at least) one of the groups has neutral beliefs, Figure 3 shows that there
always exist (c, σ)−combinations which give rise to the gridlock equilibrium.
Figure 4 here
Figure 4, finally, illustrates the situation for different degrees of disagreement. In Figure 4a.,
both pL and pR are relatively close to 1/2 (“mild”disagreement). So σ̃L takes a comparatively
high value and the asymptote of the σ̃R-curve is close to the y-axis. As a result, the set of
(c, σ)−combinations giving rise to the gridlock equilibrium is small. In Figure 4b., pL and pR
are closer to the polar values 1 and 0, respectively (“strong” disagreement). The “gridlock
area”is therefore comparatively large. To summarize, we have the following results:
Proposition 3 Assuming non-neutral and disagreeing beliefs (i.e., pL > 1/2 and pR < 1/2),
there are two types of equilibria: Experimentation and gridlock. Whenever:
• c is suffi ciently low and σ is suffi ciently high (area above the solid line in Figure 3), the
gridlock equilibrium emerges. This is an equilibrium in which the proposed reform policy
is vetoed in both periods and, as a result, agents are unable to learn;
• c is suffi ciently high and σ is suffi ciently low (area below the solid line in Figure 3), the
experimentation equilibrium emerges. This is an equilibrium in which a reform policy is
adopted in t = 0 and, after the updating of beliefs, potentially revised in t = 1.
A higher degree of disagreement (i.e., a higher value of pL or a lower value of pR) is
associated with a larger “gridlock area”.
Proof. See the text above.
The main point of Proposition 3 is that disagreeing beliefs, through their impact on the
political process, can lead to a paradoxical situation: Although everyone knows that a Pareto-
improving reform does exist, decisions are taken that prevent the implementation of any reform.
The consequence is that the economy is stuck in an “bad”equilibrium with sub-optimal policies
18
and a persistently strong disagreement. In other words, disagreeing beliefs undermine the very
societal learning process that would narrow down disagreement over time.
Disagreement is bad for policy experimentation for two related reasons. First, from the
perspective of the opposition, the reform option the incumbent wants to try first is the wrong
one and hence expected to impose a short-term loss. Second, the opposition anticipates that the
incumbent may stick the wrong policy even if —in the view of the opposition —a low realization
of Y0 mandated a reversal of the reform. Because of this low propensity to revisit an earlier
decision, the opposition expects a low (or even negative) long-run payoff from experimentation,
i.e., a payoff that may not cover the short-term loss. As a result, the opposition may be
willing to spend resources on securing the status quo. A symmetric argument explains why
the incumbent is reluctant to experiment with the opposition’s preferred policy option.
5 Disagreement and Economic Growth
We now characterize expected output growth and explore how it is affected by the primitives
of the model. We do so from an impartial and ex ante point of view. This requires taking a
stance on the appropriate belief about p, i.e., the belief adopted by an impartial rational agent.
5.1 Impartial Rational Beliefs
As noted earlier, achieving broad policy goals (like outward orientation or a more effi cient
allocation of credit) requires different measures in different countries. Whether a certain reform
policy works in a particular country is often highly context-specific. Extrapolating from the
experiences of other countries is therefore diffi cult and implementing reforms often means
setting out for the unknown. We capture this prototypical situation by assuming that the
parameter p is objectively unknown in the sense that the success probability of either of the
two reform alternatives cannot be reliably judged based on existing evidence.
Treating p as an objectively unknown parameter requires us to specify how an impartial
rational agent would come up with a prior belief regarding p. Following the principle of
indifference (which goes back to Bayes and Laplace), we assume that an impartial rational agent
would adopt a flat prior and treat p as being uniformly distributed over the range [0, 1].12 It is
straightforward to show that this is equivalent to assuming p = 1/2. An important implication
of taking a stance on the appropriate belief is that prior beliefs deviating from p = 1/2 are to
12 In a setting with binary outcomes (success/failure) and no prior information, as is considered here, the flat
prior is the only plausible candidate for an uninformative prior (see Geisser, 1984).
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be seen as biased (e.g., as a result of overconfidence, as discussed above).
5.2 Economic Growth
We now turn to output growth as expected by an impartial rational agent at the beginning of
period 0. The expectation operator E in the analysis below is thus to be understood from an
ex-ante perspective and with respect to the impartial belief p = 1/2 (rather than pL or pR).
Expected growth. From equation (2), it follows that EY0 = 0 since p = 1/2 from an
impartial point of view. It is further clear from (2) that EY1 = E{aΠ1}. Expected output
growth is therefore given by E{Y1 − Y0} = E{aΠ1}. Clearly, this expectation depends on the
nature of the equilibrium that emerges. Suppose first that the parameter constellation gives
rise to the gridlock equilibrium (which involves Π0 = 0). Then, Proposition 3 implies Π1 = 0
and hence E{Y1 − Y0} = 0. On the other hand, if the parameter constellation gives rise to the
experimentation equilibrium, we obtain the following results:
Proposition 4 In the experimentation equilibrium, expected output growth is strictly positive.
Using the definitions zi ≡ ln(pi/(1− pi))σ/(2θ), i ∈ {L,R}, we obtain
E{Y1 − Y0} = θ (Φ(θ/σ − zL)− Φ(−θ/σ − zL)) > 0 (17)
if reform policy left is implemented in t = 0, and
E{Y1 − Y0} = θ (Φ(θ/σ + zR)− Φ(−θ/σ + zR)) > 0 (18)
if reform policy right is implemented in t = 0, where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The fact that expected output growth is strictly positive mirrors that experimentation leads
to learning about what type of reform policies work. While in t = 0 policy makers are “right”
in only one half of the cases, the success probability is greater than 1/2 in t = 1.
Determinants of expected growth. How is expected output growth affected by the prim-
itives of the model? Our analysis suggests two basic correlations. First, assuming non-neutral
beliefs, it predicts lower growth rates (on average) in economies that combine big exogenous
shocks with low executive strength: If σ takes a suffi ciently high, and c a suffi ciently low value,
the gridlock equilibrium prevails (Proposition 3), in which case expected output growth is zero;
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otherwise, experimentation takes place, which implies positive growth in expectations (Propo-
sition 4). An immediate corollary of this prediction is that developing or emerging economies
are less likely to experience learning-driven growth: There is strong evidence that poorer coun-
tries are exposed to big exogenous shocks (e.g., Loayza, Rancière, Servén, and Ventura, 2007),
not least because they specialize in volatile sectors (e.g., Koren and Tenreyro, 2007); at the
same time, executives in poorer countries tend to be weak in the sense that low-capacity bu-
reaucracies make it easy for dissenting groups to “throw off course” the implementation of
politically approved reforms (e.g., Rauch and Evans, 2000; Huber and McCarty, 2004; Besley
and Persson, 2009; Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni, 2011).
The second basic correlation suggested by our model is the one between disagreement and
economic growth. Assuming a combination of “big” exogenous shocks and “low” executive
strength, growth rates are predicted to be lower (on average) in economies that show more
disagreement: If the political actors disagree strongly (i.e., if pL and pR are close to their polar
values 1 and 0, respectively), the gridlock equilibrium prevails, growth is expected to be zero,
and the level of disagreement is invariably high; otherwise, if there is little initial disagreement
(i.e., if both pL and pR are close to 1/2), experimentation takes place, growth is expected to be
positive, and the gap in beliefs shrinks over time. Since mostly poorer countries combine big
exogenous shocks and low executive strength, such a negative correlation between disagreement
and growth should be primarily observed among developing and emerging economies. We do
not know of any empirical study on the impact of disagreement on economic growth. However,
the data presented in Section 2 indeed suggests a negative relationship in a cross-section of 58
developing and emerging economies.
Finally, it is interesting to explore how, in the experimentation equilibrium, expected output
growth changes with the key parameters of the model:
Proposition 5 In the experimentation equilibrium, expected output growth is:
• strictly decreasing in the magnitued of group L’s bias (pL − 1/2) if reform policy left is
implemented in t = 0; and strictly decreasing in the magnitued of group R’s bias (1/2−pR)
if reform policy right is implemented in t = 0;
• strictly decreasing in the variance of the exogenous macroeconomic shock, σ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Stronger biases reduce growth because the two actors are less likely to draw the right
conclusions from observing Y0. Suppose, for instance, that reform policy left is implemented in
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t = 0. Then, the more biased group L’s belief, the less weight the group will give to a low Y0 as
a signal that policy left is a failure. Rather, group L will more often stick to its initial policy
choice. This, in turn, lowers expected output growth under the objective belief p = 1/2. A
similar intuition holds if policy right is implemented. A higher value of σ, by contrast, implies
that observing Y0 is less informative. As a result, there is less scope for learning and wrong
decision are taken more often in t = 1.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In its report “Learning from a Decade of Reform”, the World Bank (2005) emphasizes that
the most successful developing countries tried different reform policies, thereby showing “a
focused determination to adjust policies and institutions pragmatically (p.83)” as soon as
they turned out to be inappropriate. Countries which did not show such a determination
to experiment, learn, and adjust were less successful. But why might countries lack this
important determination? The present paper emphasizes the role of disagreeing beliefs about
the nature of successful reforms. If the view on policy differs substantially between the executive
and the opposition, the latter fears that the reform policy proposed by the executive would
remain in place even if —from the perspective of the opposition —the results turned out to be
unsatisfactory and called for a reversal of the reform. The opposition may therefore perceive
a negative long-run payoff from experimentation and thus be prepared to block the proposed
deviation from the status quo. In our model, such a gridlock equilibrium leads to stagnation
and, holding constant the level of disagreement, emerges whenever there is a combination of
high exogenous volatility and low executive strength. There is clear evidence in the literature
that this combination is characteristic of developing countries.
We further identify the extent of disagreement as an important determinant of the political
equilibrium. In economies that combine high exogenous volatility and low executive strength,
the gridlock equilibrium emerges whenever the extent of disagreement among the political
actors is suffi ciently high. As a result, our model suggests that stronger disagreement reduces
an economy’s growth prospects. It is interesting to observe that a negative correlations between
GDP growth and a measure of disagreement (about key economic policies) can indeed be
found in a cross-section of developing and emerging economies —even when controlling for the
potentially confounding effects of heterogeneity in income or culture.
From a policy perspective, two implications stand out. First, investing in a developing
country’s statistical capacity to identify the sources of macroeconomic shocks (exogenous vs.
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policy-induced) are likely to have a high payoff. For instance, investments with the aim to
improve the system of national income accounts are not only likely to speed up the learning
process associated with policy experimentation; such investments may also be important to
avoid that a country gets stuck in a sclerotic political equilibrium, i.e., in an equilibrium where
resources are wasted on saving the status quo and —as a consequence —experimentation and
learning are entirely absent. Second, in a situation where the main political actors have strongly
opposing views, there may be substantial payoffs from credibly communicating how little is
often known ex ante about what type of reform policy will be successful. Doing so may reduce
disagreement and hence help overcome political gridlock.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Using equations (2) and (8), and taking into account Π0 = −1,
the expression for ∆R,−1 given in equation (13) can be rewritten as
∆R,−1 = (2pR − 1) + 2
(
(1− pR)Φ(Xh)− pRΦ(X l)
)
, (19)
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution,




























where φ refers to the standard normal density. To determine the sign of this derivative,
note the following: Because Xh > X l and the standard normal density is symmetric around
zero, we have φ(Xh) > φ(X l); taking into account pR < 1/2, one can further conclude that
(1 − pR)φ(Xh) > pRφ(X l); finally, since pL > 1/2, it is clear that the first term in square
brackets (which is negative) is greater in absolute value than the second term in square brackets
(which may be negative or positive). From this, d∆R,−1/dσ < 0 follows.
Regarding the upper and lower bound of ∆R,−1, note first that the distribution of Y0 is
degenerate and Y L,−1 = 0 if σ = 0. Hence, in this case, we have Pr
[
Y0 < Y L,−1
∣∣ a = θ] = 1
and Pr
[
Y0 < Y L,−1
∣∣ a = −θ] = 0. Using these results in (13), we find that ∆R,−1 = 1. On
the other hand, if σ →∞, both Xh and X l approach minus infinity. As a result, for σ →∞,
Φ(Xh) and Φ(X l) approach 0 so that equation (19) implies ∆R,−1 = 2pR − 1.






















< 1. To see that this is








is strictly increasing in both Xh and X l.
























As explained above, φ(Xh) > φ(X l). Moreover, since pR < 1/2, we obtain d∆R,−1/dpL < 0.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that, contrary to what is stated in the lemma, there exists an
equilibrium in which v0 = 1 is followed by v1 = 0. In this case, we have D1 = 0 so that equation
(6) describes the equilibrium choices made in t = 1. Since v1 is assumed to be 0, equation (6) im-
plies (1− 2pR) θ ≤ c. Consider now ER {UR|π0 = −1, v0 = 1} ≥ ER {UR|π0 = −1, v0 = 0} ,
i.e., the condition that must hold if v0 = 1 is weakly preferred to v0 = 0. Using equations (12)
and (14), and the fact that (1− 2pR) θ ≤ c, this condition turns into
−c+ β(2pR − 1)θ ≥ (2pR − 1)θ + βθ∆R,−1.
Using the definition of ∆R,−1 given in equation (13), the above inequality can be rewritten as
(1− 2pR) θ − c ≥ 2βθ(1− pR) Pr
[
Y0 < Y L,−1
∣∣ a = θ, Π0 = −1]
−2βθpR Pr
[
Y0 < Y L,−1
∣∣ a = −θ, Π0 = −1] .
Note that the right-hand side of the above condition must be strictly positive since (1−pR) > pR
and Pr
[
Y0 < Y L,−1
∣∣ a = θ, Π0 = −1] > Pr [Y0 < Y L,−1∣∣ a = −θ, Π0 = −1]. As a result, the
left-hand side must also be strictly positive. But this is contradictory to (1− 2pR) θ ≤ c.
Proof of Lemma 2. By definition, if σ̃(c) = σ, group R is indifferent between v0 = 0 and
v0 = 1. Hence, Lemma 1 implies that ER {UR|π0 = −1, v0 = 1} = −(1+β)c. Note further that
ER {UR|π0 = −1, v0 = 0} depends on σ. If σ = 0, equation (12) and Proposition 1 imply that
ER {UR|π0 = −1, v0 = 0} = (2pR − 1 + β)θ. In this case, the two expected utilities are equal
if c = (1− 2pR− β)θ/(1 + β). Hence, σ̃((1− 2pR− β)θ/(1 + β)) = 0, as shown in Figure 2. On
the other hand, if σ →∞, equation (12) and Proposition 1 imply ER {UR|π0 = −1, v0 = 0} =
(1 + β)(2pR − 1)θ. In this case, the two expected utilities are equal if c = (1 − 2pR)θ. Hence,
limc→(1−2pR)θ σ̃(c) =∞, as shown in Figure 2. Finally, note that
dσ̃
dc







where d∆R,−1/dσ < 0 (Proposition 1). Hence, we have dσ̃/dc > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. ∆L,+1 is given by
∆L,+1 = (1− 2pL) + 2pL Pr
[
Y0 < Y R,+1
∣∣ a = −θ, Π0 = 1] (20)
−2(1− pL) Pr
[
Y0 < Y R,+1
∣∣ a = θ, Π0 = 1] .
To establish the properties of ∆L,+1, one can follow the approach taken in the proof of Propo-
sition 1.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Observing that a takes the two possible values −θ and θ with
equal probability, an alternative way of writing E{Y1 − Y0} = E{aΠ1} is
E{Y1 − Y0} = (1/2) · (−θ) · E{Π1| a = −θ}+ (1/2) · (θ) · E{Π1| a = θ}. (21)
Consider first a parameter constellation that leads to the adoption of policy left in t = 0. In
this case, according to equation (9), we have Π1 = −1 if Y0 ≥ Y L,−1 and Π1 = 1 otherwise.
As a result, the conditional expectations of Π1 are given by, respectively,
E{Π1| a = −θ} = Pr
[
Y0 ≥ Y L,−1
∣∣ a = −θ] · (−1) + Pr [Y0 < Y L,−1∣∣ a = −θ] · (1)
and
E{Π1| a = θ} = Pr
[
Y0 ≥ Y L,−1
∣∣ a = θ] · (−1) + Pr [Y0 < Y L,−1∣∣ a = θ] · (1).
Inserting these two expressions into equation (21), and rearranging terms, yields




Y0 < Y L,−1
∣∣ a = θ]− Pr [Y0 < Y L,−1∣∣ a = −θ]) .
From this, we can derive equation (17) by observing Pr
[
Y0 < Y L,−1
∣∣ a = θ] = Φ(θ/σ − zL)
and Pr
[
Y0 < Y L,−1
∣∣ a = −θ] = Φ(−θ/σ−zL), where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal distribution and zL is defined in the proposition. Since θ/σ is
strictly positive, we conclude E{Y1 − Y0} > 0.
Suppose now that the parameter constellation leads to the adoption of policy right in t = 0.
Then, according to equation (11), we have Π1 = −1 if Y0 ≤ Y R,+1 and Π1 = 1 otherwise. As
a result, the conditional expectations of Π1 are given by, respectively,
E{Π1| a = −θ} = Pr
[
Y0 ≤ Y R,+1
∣∣ a = −θ] · (−1) + Pr [Y0 > Y R,+1∣∣ a = −θ] · (1)
and
E{Π1| a = θ} = Pr
[
Y0 ≤ Y R,+1
∣∣ a = θ] · (−1) + Pr [Y0 > Y R,+1∣∣ a = θ] · (1).
By inserting these two expressions into equation (21), and by following a similar series of steps
as above, one obtains equation (18). E{Y1 − Y0} is again strictly positive because θ/σ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose first that the parameter constellation gives rise to an
experimentation equilibrium with policy left implemented in t = 0. Then, expected output






[φ(−θ/σ − zL)− φ(θ/σ − zL)] ,
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where φ denotes the standard normal density. Since φ is symmetric around zero, we have
φ(θ/σ − zL) > φ(−θ/σ − zL) and hence dE{Y1 − Y0}/dpL < 0.
Still assuming that policy left is implemented in t = 0, we further obtain
∂E{Y1 − Y0}
∂σ

























Observe that the first term in square brackets (which is negative) is greater in absolute value
than the second term in square brackets (which may be negative or positive). Given this, and
taking into account φ(θ/σ − zL) > φ(−θ/σ − zL), we find dE{Y1 − Y0}/dσ < 0.
Finally, if the parameter constellation gives rise to an experimentation equilibrium with
reform policy right implemented in t = 0, expected output growth is given by equation (18).
The signs of the partial derivatives in this case can be established in a similar way.
Appendix B
As pointed out in Section 3, this appendix characterizes the equilibrium that emerges if
the cost of a veto does not depend on the history of economic reforms. More precisely, in this
appendix, we assume that the cost of a veto in t = 1 is no longer given by equation (5) but
instead simply by c1 = c0 = c. All other assumptions are unchanged.
Note first that group R’s expected overall utility associated with (π0, v0) = (−1, 0), given
by equation (12), is unaffected by this modification (and so is Proposition 1). The reason
is that, independent of the value of c1, group R never uses its veto in t = 1 if policy left is
implemented in t = 0. Hence, in this case, the expected overall utility cannot depend on the
cost of a veto in t = 1. Note further that group R’s expected overall utility associated with
(π0, v0) = (−1, 1), given by equation (14), is also unaffected (and so is Lemma 1): Because of
the veto against policy left, no reform is implemented in t = 0; hence, in this alternative case,
equation (5) implies that c1 = c0 = c, as is assumed here. As a result, the function σ̃R(c),
which is described in Lemma 2 and illustrated in Figure 2a., is unchanged.
While Figure 2a. is unaffected by the modification considered in this appendix, Figure 2b.
is not. The reason is that we have a change to group L’s expected overall utility associated
with implementing policy right in t = 0. More specifically, one can show that
EL {UL|Π0 = 1} = −pLθ + (1− pL)θ + βθ∆̄L,+1, (22)
30
where ∆̄L,+1 denotes group L’s valuation of policy experimentation in this modified setup.
One can further show that ∆̄L,+1 is increasing in c if c < c̄; and unaffected by c if c ≥ c̄, where
c̄ ≡ 2θ pL − pR
pL + pR − 2pLpR
.
The positive relationship at lower levels of c is due to the fact that the range of Y0-observations
that make group R veto a proposed policy change in t = 1 narrows down as c increases.
Put differently, a higher cost of a veto means that group L is more often in a position to
implement its preferred policy in t = 1, a fact that is reflected in a higher valuation of policy
experimentation. However, if the cost of a veto is suffi ciently high (i.e., if c exceeds c̄), group
R will never use its veto in t = 1 so that c does no longer affect ∆̄L,+1.
Figure 5 here
The fact that EL {UL|Π0 = 1} is no longer independent of c has consequences for the σ̃L-
line shown in Figure 2b. Specifically, σ̃L (i.e., the level of σ below which group L chooses right
in t = 0 if a veto against left is anticipated) is now increasing in c if 1−2pL+β > 0, as shown in
Figure 5a. Otherwise, if 1−2pL+β ≤ 0, such a σ̃L does not exist (as is the case in the version
of the model discussed in the main part of the paper). Figure 5b., finally, is the modified version
of Figure 3. It illustrates that the qualitative characterization of the equilibrium provided in
Proposition 3 also applies to the model version considered here.
31
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